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Abstract 22 Social transmission of behavior can be realized through distinct mechanisms. Research on primate 23 social learning typically distinguishes two forms of information that a learner can extract from a 24 demonstrator: copying actions (defined as imitation), or copying only the consequential results (defined 25 as emulation). We propose a decomposition of these learning mechanisms (plus individual learning) 26 that incorporates the core idea that social learning can be represented as a search for an optimal 27 behavior that is constrained by different kinds of information. We illustrate our approach with an 28 individual based model in which individuals solve tasks in abstract "spaces" that represent behavioral 29 actions, results, and benefits of those results. Depending on the learning mechanism at their disposal, The differences between imitation and emulation may have profound implications for the 44 capacity and scope of cultural transmission. In particular, it has been proposed that the capacity to 45 reliably copy the actions of a demonstrator could make cumulative culture, technology and complex 46 cultural behaviors possible, as is the case in humans, while non-human ape cultures may be better 47 referred to as "traditions" (Galef 1992; Tomasello 1996) . A reason for this difference is that emulation 48 learning may be too inaccurate for a cultural ratchet to operate (Richerson & Boyd 2005 Tennie et al. 2006 Tennie et al. , 2009 Tomasello 1999 ; compare also Whiten & van Schaik 2007) . In fact, while 50 imitation potentially results in the preservation of both process and product with a close one-to-one 51 relationship between the two, emulation, by focusing only on the product or environmental effects, may 52 lead to a failure in the preservation of the processes (Tennie et al. 2009 ). 53 To help understand the distinction between emulation and imitation, it is useful to consider a 54 concrete task. For example, consider the specific task of tying a certain type of knot, and imagine about the form of the knot when it is completed, but she is "blind" to the process that produced the 59 p. 4 knot. In order to arrive at the desired knot, the emulator may perform a series of actions with the rope 60 without guidance and eventually "compare" her result with the observed knot. By comparison, if the 61 individual is an imitator, she has additional information on the intermediate behavioral steps (more or   62 less fine-grained) needed to produce the knot. She could use this information to guide her actions. 63 Finally, individual learners have neither type of social information available. They rely only on self-64 evaluation of the effects that their own actions achieve. 65 In what follows, we present an individual based model that investigates the consequences of 66 using imitation, emulation and individual learning. The model is based on the core idea that social 67 learning can be represented as a search for an optimal behavior that is constrained by different kinds of 68 information. Crucially, our approach differs from most other theoretical models that investigate cultural 69 dynamics using mathematical tools developed in population genetics and epidemiology, which have differential access to the information conveyed in these spaces, with imitators using both actions 85 and benefits spaces, emulators using both results and benefits spaces, and individual learners using only 86 benefits space. We illustrate how differently shaped spaces represent different classes of tasks, and, 87 with our model, we show that these classes provide different advantages for the three learning 88 mechanisms that we investigated. In an extension of the main model we consider chains of individuals 89 that learn iteratively from one another. This model draws inspiration from the linear transmission chain 90 method used in cultural learning research and we therefore call it the "transmission chain 91 model" (Mesoudi & Whiten 2008) . The model allows us to check whether an initial optimal behavior 92 can be transmitted and maintained across generation using either imitation or emulation. Moreover, 93 since in the iterative learning process the initial optimal behavior can get "lost", we can test the effect 94 of sub-optimal demonstrators on the two social learning mechanisms. In the last section, we discuss the 95 relevance of our results to cultural evolutionary modeling, current experimental studies, and the 96 relationship between social learning mechanisms and the evolution of human culture. The actions space has a correspondence in the results space (see Fig. 1 non-matching, and thus not considered to be a result.
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The actions space and results space have a final correspondence in the benefits space (see Fig.1 121 left panels). Here, each behavior that produces a result also produces a net benefit. Note that the same 122 result can have different benefits depending on the specific combination of actions used to obtain it.
123
The underlying logic is that some actions combinations may be more effective than others, even if the 124 result appears to be the same. These differences in benefits could arise because one action is less costly that are similar but not identical to the correct combination needed to tie them, these will produce 162 neither any usable result nor any tangible modification of the environment.
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In the third and last condition, the hidden plateau task (see Fig. 1, e-f zero), the result gives some indication that it is "close" to the optimal behavior. whole space, but only to a subset of two neighboring variants. information from an "ideal" demonstrator who is performing the correct behavior at b max on the space.
194
(1) Individual learners accept a new action if it does not reduce the benefit they were obtaining; result, but they know how well their result matches the demonstrator's result.
214
As noted above, social learners are likely to also make decisions based on the net benefits that 
Results
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Main model
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In the smooth task condition, the effectiveness of the three learning mechanisms was similar in terms of 252 average benefits through time and in the average length of time required to reach b max (Fig. 2, a) .
253
Individual learners exploited the benefits gradient to orient their search for optimal behavior, and social 254 learning appeared to provide no advantages relative to individual learning. Thus, we found that social more often than imitators (98% ± 3 SD).
260
In contrast to the smooth task condition, in the peaked task condition, imitation outperformed 261 both emulation and individual learning (Fig. 2, b) . In this task, the benefits and results spaces did not To understand the differential performance of imitators and emulators it is useful to think about 276 how individuals with different learning strategies view the spaces in terms of attractors (Fig. 3) , and 277 specifically how they use information to move through the space. Imitators move in the space as if they 278 can attach to the "cross-hairs" of a target. Once they land on a correct action, they move randomly 279 along the axis defined by this action until they reach the other correct action (Fig. 3, a) . In contrast, the 280 emulators' attractor is the area of the space in which they obtain the demonstrator's result (Fig. 3, b) .
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Once in the plateau, they move randomly on the plateau until they find the optimum. In the transmission chain model, the learned behavior was iteratively transmitted across generations of 299 individuals. Our simulation of this process produced results that were largely congruent with those 300 found in the main model. Thus, in the peaked task condition (Fig. 5, a) , chains of imitators 301 outperformed chains of emulators. Given a sufficient duration of the learning phase (approximately 302 from 500 steps), imitation was effective in transmitting the initial optimal behavior across generations.
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Emulation was never as effective as imitation in the peaked task, and, even for relatively long learning 304 phases (e.g. 1000 steps), chains of emulators never achieved the optimal behavior at the end of the 305 iterative process (i.e. the average final benefit never reached 1). In the hidden plateau condition (Fig. 5,   306 b), however, the two social learning mechanisms were equally effective in transmitting the optimal 307 behavior across generations, provided an adequately long learning phase (i.e. greater than about 500 308 steps). 
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In contrast, our findings indicate that imitation is especially useful for solving peaked tasks.
339
Such tasks not only require the chaining of correct actions (in a correct sequence), but they also provide 340 little or no feedback for performing behaviors other than the optimal one (here we assumed no 
